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longer be required before a local execution may issue, for issuance
thereof may be accomplished by registration of the judgment in
conformity with statutory requirements. The former remedy by
suit may still be utilized, if that is desired, for the new statute is
not made exclusive in character. The legislature has also in-
creased the amount of wages exempt from garnishment by rais-
ing the figure to $25 in lieu of the former exemption of $20
heretofore prevailing.9
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Although there has been no noticeable decline in the number
of criminal cases handled by the courts, very little has been done
to change basic principles of substantive criminal law. The case
of People v. Liss,1 however, is noteworthy as it establishes a limita-
tion upon the application of the statute relating to concealed
weapons. 2  Upon arrest of the defendant there concerned for
passing a stop light, the officer searched the automobile and dis-
covered an automatic pistol pushed back about six inches under
the front seat and lying about mid-way between the front doors.
Defendant's conviction on an information charging that he un-
lawfully carried concealed weapons "on or about his person" was
affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District but, on
writ of error to the Supreme Court, a majority of that court
agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain the conviction because the pistol was not readily accessible,
it not being sufficiently "on or about" the person of the defend-
ant to bring the case within the statute. The majority relied
upon the decision in People v. Niemoth3 where a conviction of a
defendant who had carried loaded revolvers on the rear seat of
his car had been reversed on the theory that the revolvers were
not readily available because the defendant there could not have
9 Laws 1951, p. 1947, S.B. 221; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 14.
1406 Ill. 419, 94 N. E. (2d) 320 (1950), reversing 338 Ill. App. 657, 88 N. E. (2d)
334 (1949). Daily, J., wrote a dissenting opinion. Wilson, J., also dissented. See
also note in 26 N. Y. U. L. Q. 210.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 155.
3322 Ill. 51, 152 N. E. 537 (1926).
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reached for them without moving from his position on the front
seat. With the aid of that case, the court construed the statute
to require that the weapon either had to be actually concealed on
the person or, if not so carried, then had to be "in such close
proximity that it [could] be readily used as though on the per-
son. "4 The dissenting judges were of the opinion that, as the
amount of movement required to obtain the weapon would be
negligible, the limitation placed on the statute by the majority
virtually rendered the statute nugatory in cases involving weapons
found "about" the person.
Inasmuch as the concealed weapons cases 5 present an in-
finite variety and gradation of "ready accessibility," it cannot be
said that the majority of the court is clearly wrong. Analogous
reversals of convictions may be seen in cases where the weapon
was in a locked glove compartment, 6 or where it was wedged
between the front seat and the door frame, with a defendant sit-
ting about four and one-half feet away from it. 7 On the other
hand, the majority could have drawn the line so as to bring the
Liss case within the "ready accessibility" test applied in another
Illinois case where the gun lay on the floor of a car in front of
the rear seat where the defendant sat." Moreover, other courts
have upheld convictions in cases where the defendant could obtain
the weapon without moving from the front seat,9 where the
weapon was located on a shelf behind the seat of a coupe, 10 or
where it was behind a movable cushion of the rear seat." It would
4406 Ii1. 419 at 422, 94 N. E. (2d) 320 at 322. The majority noted the corrobora-
tive facts that the defendant owned neither the automobile nor the pistol and had
testified that he had no knowledge of the presence of the weapon in the car.
5 The cases are collected in annotations to be found in 50 A. L. R. 1534 and 88
A. L R. 807.
6 Turley v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 89, 209 S. W. (2d) 843 (1948).
7 State v. Simon, 57 S. W. (2d) 1062 (Mo. Sup., 1933).
8 See People v. Eustice, 371 Ill. 159, 20 N. E. (2d) 83 (1939), distinguishing the
holding in People v. Nlemoth, 322 Ill. 51, 152 N. E. 537 (1939).
9 United States v. Waters, 73 F. Supp. 72 (1947). The opinion therein fails to
disclose the exact location of the gun.
10 Hampton v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 626, 78 S. W. (2d) 748 (1934).
11 Commonwealth v. Miller, 97 Mass. 285, 8 N. E. (2d) 603 (1937). The prosecu-
tion was based on a statute prohibiting the carrying of guns in vehicles without a
license. It was said that the trial judge could not properly have ruled, as a matter
of law, that weapons hidden behind the movable arm of the rear seat cushion were
not within the control of the defendant.
SURVEY OP ILLINOIS LAW-1950-1951
seem as if a borderline case of this character ought not be ex-
tended beyond its own facts. To hold otherwise would encourage
would-be criminals to have weapons in their presence, but just
far enough out of immediate reach, to enable them to invoke this
extreme refinement of the "ready accessibility" test.
Another reversal of a conviction, this time in the case of
People v. West,'2 throws some light on the statutory offense of
operating a confidence game. The defendant there, a business-
man operating in Illinois and Ohio, made regular use of a Chicago
currency exchange to cash checks totalling between $30,000 and
$40,000 over a five-month period. One $900 check was returned
marked "account closed" and another for $1,000, given to cover
this default, was subsequently returned marked "not sufficient
funds." On the basis thereof, defendant was convicted of the
crime of operating a confidence game. The Supreme Court re-
versed, however, holding that, to support such a conviction, it was
necessary to show that the confidence had been obtained fraudu-
lently and with intent to swindle. It indicated that if the con-
fidence be obtained through a regular course of business dealing
the statute would not be violated, notwithstanding there was a
subsequent abuse of that confidence. Although the fact situation
was one wherein the confidence was originally built up through
apparently honest means, the decision raises a question as to
whether the statute is deficient in not providing protection
against the acts of those who slip from honest to dishonest deal-
ings.' 3
Statutory changes have also. been made in the substance of
the criminal law. In the first place, public reaction to the increas-
ing use, particularly by juveniles, of narcotic drugs may be noted
via the medium of certain local changes in the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act, 14 but a criticism has been raised both as to the wisdom
and the constitutionality of the changes. 15 New offenses have
12 406 Ill. 249, 93 N. E. (2d) 370 (1950), noted in 1951 Ill. L. Forum 175.
13 The prosecution was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 256. Earlier
cases In point would appear to exist in the holdings in People v. Gould, 363 Ill. 348,
2 N. E. (2d) 324 (1936), and People v. Snyder, 327 Ill. 402, 158 N. E. 677 (1927).
14 Laws 1951, p. 90, H.B. 544; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.1 et seq.
15 See Wolf, "Haste Makes for Worse than Waste," 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW Rvxmw
315-21 (1951).
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been created (1) to cover the conduct of persons tampering with
aircraft without authority or permission;16 (2) to punish those
who, having other persons in custody, prevent the ones restrained
from consulting with a lawyer or communicating with relatives
within a reasonably short space of time ;17 and (3) to penalize
jail guards and the like who smuggle materials into or out of
penal institutions operated by the state in violation of prison
regulations.' The crime of assault and battery has now been
subdivided into simple assault and battery on the one hand and
aggravated assault and battery on the other. 9 The latter offense,
carrying a heavier penalty, is defined as the "unlawful and
violent beating of another which results in severe personal in-
jury." It remains to be seen whether the relative term "severe"
will be regarded as sufficiently definitive to meet constitutional
requirements relating to a charge of crime.
Other changes have occurred in regard to the measure of
punishment to be imposed for crimes already included within the
code. It would seem that the petty thief, social outcast though he
may be, is not to be prejudiced more than anyone else by the
high cost of living, for the critical element of value, which dis-
tinguishes grand larceny from petit larceny,20 has been raised
from $15 to $50, thereby securing the petty thief against what
would be a rather serious consequence of inflation. 21 His country
cousin, however, who attempts to steal by altering or defacing the
brand or mark upon certain named domestic animals, is not so
protected. He is to be punished by a term of imprisonment in
the penitentiary where the animal is valued at $15 or more22 but,
16 Laws 1951, p. 1040, S.B. 334: Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 438a.
17 Laws 1951, p. 105, H.13. 115; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 449.1.
18 Laws 1951, p. 2086, S.B. 313; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 445a.
19 Laws 1951, p. 2087, S.B. 373; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 55 et seq.
20 In People v. Swinson, 406 Ill. 233, 92 N. E. (2d) 758 (1950), for example, it
was held to be error to sentence a defendant to a penitentiary term where the jury,
without fixing the value of the property, had returned a verdict of guilty of larceny
of a quantity of corn. Value is not the sole criterion for theft from the person, or
theft of a horse or of an automobile, has been declared to be grand larceny: Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 389, § 397 and § 387a, respectively. The stealing
or falsifying of public records is also to be dealt with as grand larceny under
Ch. 38, § 401.
21 Laws 1951, p. 179, S.B. 53; I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 389.
22 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 446.
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if he succeeds in stealing a cow of the value, say, of $40 without
tampering with the brand or mark, his punishment, at most, would
be a year of imprisonment in a county jail.23 There being nothing
to show that the inflationary process has left the value of farm
animals untouched, it would seem as if the section relating to the
criminal changing of marks and brands should be amended to
correspond with the one relating to larceny in general.
24
Increase may also be noted in relation to the punishment for
bribery in connection with sporting events ;25 for the illegal em-
ployment, exhibition, or endangering the life or health of a child ;26
and for violation of the rule relating to the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings. 27 As amended, the punishment for the latter offense
by way of fine has been deleted and a purported mandatory jail
sentence up to one year in duration has been substituted in lieu
thereof. The presence of a typographical error, however, may
have sterilized the statute in question.
28
Elements of criminal procedure have been considered, both
by the courts and the legislature. From the judicial standpoint,
the power of an officer to make an arrest without a warrant has
been clarified by the recent Supreme Court decision in People v.
Edge,29 a case which construes the term "criminal offense" as
used in the statute providing for arrest without a warrant.80 The
defendant there appealed from a conviction on a charge of pos-
sessing policy tickets. 31 He contended, inter alia, that the origi-
23 The same thing would be true for the theft of sheep, goats and pigs, all referred
to in Ch. 38, § 446, but not for horses, mules and asses. Theft of the latter would be
grand larceny, without regard to value, under Ch. 38, § 397.
24 See a note in 10 La. L. Rev. 490 dealing with the effect of inflation upon the
value-penalty ratio in theft cases.
25 Laws 1951, p. 1&70, H.B. 295: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 83a. Here-
tofore, fine and imprisonment were alternative forms of punishment.
26 Laws 1951, p. 1671, H.B. 547; Ill. Rev. Stat. 195A, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 92 et seq.
27 Laws 1951, p. 1849, S.B. 454; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 720.
28 The publishers of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951 have printed the concluding sentence of
Ch. 38, § 720, to read: "Whoever violates this section shall be imprisoned . . . for
not more than one year." Italics added. The text of Laws 1951, p. 1849, certified
to be a true and correct copy by the Secretary of State, concludes: "Whoever
violates this section shall be imprisoned . . . for not more than [one] on year."
Italics added. If the engrossed bill reads "on year," the penalty provision would
seem to be fatally defective since no such time period exists.
29406 I. 490, 94 N. E. (2d) 359 (1950).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 657.
31 The prosecution was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 413.
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nal arrest and the accompanying search was illegal as the arrest-
ing officer lacked a warrant. Relying upon holdings in People
v. Ford and People v. Davies32 for the principle that the term
''criminal offense" includes all felonies, however great, and all
misdemeanors, however slight, the Supreme Court held that a
violation of a municipal ordinance which would subject a defend-
ant to a fine was to be deemed a "criminal offense" within the
contemplation of the statute, justifying both the arrest and the
search. Although the defendant's argument was not wholly un-
reasonable,3 3 the holding finds foundation in the Cities and Vil-
Lages Act as well as in a city ordinance enacted pursuant thereto.3 4
There would also appear to be corroborating authority in the
TMunicipal Court Act .
3
The holding in People v. Bobczyk 36 should make the job of
prosecutor easier, in drunken driving cases, for the court there
held that the result of a test performed on a device known as
a Harger Drunkometer was admissible in evidence to prove the
alcoholic content of the subject's breath. It should be noted,
however, that the question of a possible invasion of the consti-
-tutional guarantee against self-incrimination was not there con-
sidered because of technical reasons growing out of the defend-
ant's choice of reviewing tribunals.
Two cases may also serve to throw light on proceedings based
32356 Ill. 572, 191 N. E. 315 (1934), and 354 Ill. 168, 188 N. E. 337 (1933),
respectively.
33 Statutory distinction is made between violations of municipal ordinances and
other criminal offenses. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 10-8, relating to
municipal ordinances, for example, provides that in all actions for the violation of
any municipal ordinance the first process shall be "a summons or a warrant." A
warrant for arrest shall issue only "upon the affidavit of any person [who] has
reasonable ground to believe that the party charged is guilty .. " Ch. 38, § 785,
relating to probation in case of certain offenses, refers to violations of municipal
ordinances and other criminal offenses in the disjunctive. Section 787 of the same
statute, describing conditions for release, provides that the "probationer shall not,
during the term of his probation, violate any criminal law of the State of Illinois or
any ordinance of any municipality of said state." Italics added.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 24-78; Mun. Code of Chicago, 1939, Ch. 11,
§25.
35 Ibid., Ch. 37, § 477, declares that any "police officer of the city may arrest on
view any person who may be seen . .. in the act of violating, within the city, any
ordinance . ..whenever such violation is, by such ordinance, made punishable by
fine or otherwise."
36 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N. E. (2d) 567 (1951).
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on the so-called "criminal sexual psychopath" laws.3 7  In the
first, that of People v. Ross,38 the issue was one as to whether or
not review, by writ of error, could be obtained against a deter-
mination that the petitioner was a sexual phychopath. The Su-
preme Court noted the absence of any statutory provision per-
mitting review, likened the matter to an issue arising under the
Insanity Act, and transferred the cause as not being within its
jurisdiction. In the other case, that of People ex rel. Elliott v.
Juergels,39 a writ of mandamus had been sought against a county
judge because he had refused to entertain sexual psychopath pro-
ceedings against a number of inmates at Menard penitentiary
whose terms were expiring but who, in the judgment of the
Director of Public Safety, ought not be released because of demon-
strated sexual aberrations but should be transferred to an appro-
priate hospital for treatment. The county judge had apparently
refused to act on the belief that the statute was unconstitutional.
40
Although the Supreme Court held the statute to be both consti-
tutional and applicable to convicted as well as unconvicted per-
sons, 41 it approved a decision denying the writ of mandamus
because an element of judicial discretion was involved in the
action of the county court. There is enough in these cases to
indicate that the criminal sexual psychopath law would bear legis-
lative re-examination to prevent a forfeiture of liberty through an
erroneous determination by a nisi prius court.
42
A much needed amendment to the statute relating to grand
juries was adopted during the year, one which permits an exten-
sion of grand jury service for up to three months in Cook
County.48 Prior to the amendment, the statutory scheme lacked
37 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 820 et seq.
38407 Ill. 199, 95 N. E. (2d) 61 (1950). After transfer to the Appellate Court for
the Second District, that court, not in the period of this survey, held that there was
neither a statutory nor a common law basis for review and it too dismissed the
proceeding without passing upon the merits of the case: 344 Ill. App. 407, 101 N. E.
(2d) 112 (1951).
39 407 ll. 391, 95 N. E. (2d) 602 (1950).
40 The statute was held valid, in People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N. E. (2d) 703
(1943), as applied to a sexual psychopath prior to any criminal conviction.
41 It possessed jurisdiction to review the trial court holding because of the con-
stitutional question involved: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
42 Habeas corpus would seem to provide an inadequate remedy against error.
43 Laws 1951, p. 15, H.B. 74; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 78, § 9.
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uniformity in that, in other counties of the state, a court might
retain the grand jury attendant upon it for a period as long as
three months, while the Criminal Court of Cook County could
retain its grand jury for but one month. The apparent incon-
sistency arose from the fact that the courts of other counties
lacked a stated term of court,44 whereas the Criminal Court of
Cook County has a term of one month in duration.45  The grand
jury law also formerly authorized grand jurors, in courts having
terms fixed by law, to serve for the term for which they were
summoned but, in courts having no terms, to serve for such
time as the court might direct but not to exceed three months.
48
Despite this, it had been argued, in People v. Brautigan,47 that
action of an extended Cook County grand jury could be upheld
on the doctrine that such a jury was at least a de facto officer of
the government. The court found that it was not legally possible
for a de facto jury to exist concurrently with a de jure body
which had been regularly constituted, so it rejected the argument.
The new law purports to authorize the two bodies to exist
simultaneously but limits the extended grand jury to the investi-
gation of only those matters which it had under consideration
during its original term. By limiting the total period of service
to three months, the provision should tend to prevent undue pro-
crastination by the prosecutor as well as to avoid the criticism
of a "standing grand jury" such as has been directed toward
a parallel provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
48
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 176.
45 Ibid., Ch. 37, § 165a.
46 Iln. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 78, § 9.
47 310 Ill. 472, 142 N. E. 208 (1924). A grand jury of the Criminal Court of Cook
County had been continued, on court order, upon a finding that it was for the best
interests of public justice that the grand jury be so continued in order to complete
its investigation into the conduct of members of the Chicago Board of Education
as well as others connected therewith. The defendant had refused to answer ques-
tions before the extended grand jury and had been summarily punished for contempt.
The conviction was held to be erroneous because the grand jury, extended without
statutory authority, lacked the power to question the defendant.
48 See Stewart, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (U. S. Law Printing Co.,
Chicago, 1945), p. 46. Federal Rule 6(g) provides: "A grand jury shall serve until
discharged by the court but no grand jury may serve more than eighteen months.
The tenure and powers of a grand jury are not affected by the beginning of expira-
tion of a term of court .... " Although the explanatory note of the Advisory Com-
mittee, 18 U. S. C. A. § 126, would indicate that the subject matter under
investigation must be limited to that already being considered, the plain meaning of
the second sentence of the rule seems to be otherwise.
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Provision has also been made for a special grand jury.49 In view
of the provision in the Illinois Constitution of 1870 which permits
of legislative abolition of the grand jury,50 the amendment could
hardly be said to conflict with any constitutional right on the
subject although that objection could have been raised if the right
to indictment by a grand jury was not so subject. 51
The legislature has also aided in other aspects of procedure
(1) by enacting a statute fixing venue, for purpose of prosecution,
as to all offenses committed in any aircraft while the same is
being navigated through the airspace within the state ;52 (2) by
nullifying any tacit time limitation on prosecutions for treason ;53
and (3) by transferring jurisdiction over the sections relating to
the manufacture of bedding to the Department of Health.
54  It
has also made other revisions in the law relating to probation
and parole.
55
While the balance of the law in this field has gone unchanged,
an interesting sidelight on the nature and effect of punishment
may be observed in the federal case of United States ex rel.
McMahon v. Neely. 6 The federal Immigration Act provides for
the deportation of any alien who, subsequent to his entry, has
been sentenced to imprisonment more than once, for a term of
a year or more, in connection with a crime involving moral turpi-
tude.57  The petitioner there had been arrested for immediate
49 Special grand juries may be convened by a judge of any court of record when
he is of the opinion that public justice requires it: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Oh. 78, § 19.
50 Il1. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8.
51 See Opinion to the Governor, 62 R. I. 200, 4 A. (2d) 487, 121 A. L. I. 806
(1939), to the effect that a statute purporting to authorize an additional grand jury
to sit concurrently with a regular grand jury would violate the Rhode Island Bill
of Rights. The court expressly distinguished the Rhode Island provision from the
one in Illinois on the ground that the latter permits of legislative change on the
point.
52 Laws 1951, p. 1039, S.B. 333; Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 710.
53 Laws 1951, p. 220, H3.B. 453; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Oh. 38, § 629. An
indictment for treason may now be found at any time after the commission of the
offense.
54 Laws 1951, p. 1040, H.B. 270; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 67 et seq.
Heretofore, under Ch. 38, § 73, the prosecuting function was vested In the Depart-
ment of Labor, although the matter primarily pertains to sanitation measures.
55 Laws 1951, p. 1031, S.B. 241, and p. 1917, S.B. 582; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951. Vol. 1.
Ch. 38, § 801 et seq.
56 186 F. (2d) 846 (1951).
578 U. S. C. A. § 155(a).
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deportation, pursuant to a deportation order approved by the
Board of Immigration Appeals, on the ground that he had twice,
since his arrival in this country, pleaded guilty to charges of
grand larceny and had twice been sentenced to the Illinois Re-
formatory, serving more than a year each time. On petition for
habeas corpus, he raised the question as to whether or not a. sen-
tence to imprisonment in the reformatory was a sentence to
"imprisonment" of the kind required by the Immigration Act.
The District Court, on the authority of two prior federal cases on
the point,58 held that incarceration in the reformatory was not of
the type required and ordered the petitioner discharged from
custody.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
holding, pointing out that the cases relied on emphasized the cor-
rectional nature of the treatment accorded the juveniles there
concerned. The petitioner, it noted, had been sentenced and im-
prisoned under the Illinois Sentence Commitment and Parole Act
of 1917, pursuant to which youthful offenders could be sent to
the reformatory.5 9 The statute then envisioned segregation of
offenders in this class not only from older criminals but also
from one another.60 Using the test suggested in the case of
United States ex rel. Popoff v. Reimer,6' i. e., one as to whether
or not the punitive element in the imprisonment was "substan-
tial," as amplified in the case of United States ex rel. Bruno v.
Reimer,6 2 where the court stressed the idea that punishment
for crime had to be "clearly subordinated" in the case of juve-
nile offenders, the court reached the opinion that confinement
58 United States ex rel. Rizzio v. Kenney, 50 F. (2d) 418 (1931), and United
States ex rel. Cerami v. Uhl, 78 F. (2d) 698 (1935). It was held, in the last men-
tioned case, that where the "prime object" of confinement is correctional, and the
punitive element is relatively unimportant, there is no "sentence to imprisonment"
of the kind required by the Immigration Act.
59 Laws 1917, p. 353. As subsequently amended, the provision now appears in Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 803.
60 The 1917 laws classified inmates of the reformatory into two divisions, the first
to include males between sixteen and twenty-one, and the second to include males
between twenty-one and twenty-six.
61 79 F. (2d) 513 (1935). The court there found that the punitive element con-
tained in a period of imprisonment in a reformatory was "clearly more substantial"
than the punitive element involved in a confinement in a New York house of refuge.
62 103 F. (2d) 341 (1939).
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in the reformatory under the 1917 statute was a sentence to im-
prisonment of the kind meant by the Immigration Act. Subse-
quent amendments to the Illinois statute, however, have placed
emphasis on the idea of reformation, rather than on punishment,
of convicts 3 so it would seem possible, if the question should
arise again, that a period of imprisonment in the reformatory
under the present law might be regarded as being insufficient for
this purpose. Multiple sentences of an alien youth to the Illinois
reformatory, even for crimes involving moral turpitude, may not,
therefore, be sufficient to subject him to deportation.
V. FAMILY LAW
Most current issues relating to family law grow from attempts
to enforce the obligation to pay alimony. For example, the prob-
lem of whether or not a property settlement agreement calling for
the payment of a definite sum of money by installments, when
incorporated into a divorce decree, amounts to a lump sum settle-
ment or is merely a provision for periodic alimony has again
come before the courts during the survey period. The first case,
that of Coleman v. Coleman,' decided by the Appellate Court for
the Fourth District, was one in which the ex-husband petitioned
for cancellation of the agreement on the ground of the remarri-
age of his former wife. He relied on Section 18 of the Divorce
Act as it read prior to its amendment. 2 His petition was countered
with the claim that the agreement was a lump sum settlement,
hence not subject to modification, or if found to be wanting as a
lump sum settlement, was not affected because the 1949 amend-
ment applied.3 The court ruled for the defendant, holding that
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 118, § 13.1, establishing the Illinois State
Reformatory at Sheridan, announces it to be purpose of such reformatory to provide
a place for the "confinement and rehabilitation of n~ale persons" under seventeen at
the time of conviction and sentence for felonies.
1341 Il. App. 462, 94 N. E. (2d) 507 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 280 and 45 Ill. L. Rev. 805.
2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 19.
3 Laws 1949, p. 729, S.B. 175; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19. The amend-
ment provided that ". . . a party shall not be entitled to alimony and maintenance
after remarriage; but, regardless of remarriage by such party or death of either
party, such party shall be entitled to receive the unpaid installments of any settle-
ment in lieu of alimony ordered to be paid or conveyed in the decree."
